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1. INTRODUCTION
The casualties of the Second World War were not limited to
the human victims. Along with the millions of lives lost during
the Holocaust, millions of works of art fell victim to the Nazi
Regime.1 Although the capture of art and cultural property dur-
ing a war is an ancient practice, the Nazis systematically looted
Europe's art during World War II on an unprecedented scale.2
The theft of this art was not simply a case of the victors claiming
the spoils. For Hitler, both the acquisition and cleansing of art
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, University of Pennsylvania Law School;B.A., 1996,
University of Virginia. I would like to thank my family for their uncondi-
tional love and support. I would also like to thank Karen Hook for casually
mentioning THE LOST MUSEUM and thereby providing me with a wonderfu
comment topic. Lastly, I would like to thank my father, Russell Falconer, for
his generosity and encouragement over the last three years. This Comment is
dedicated to my mother, Carol Falconer, because even after three years of law
school I still do not know how to begin to thank her.
1 See Lynn H. Nicholas, World War Il and the Displacement ofArt and Cul-
tural Property, in THE SPOILS OF WAR 39, 39 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997);
Stephen K. Urice, World War II and the Movement of Cultural Property: An In-
troduction and BriefBibliography for the Museum Administrator, SC40 ALI-ABA
1, *4 (1998), available in 'WESTLAW.
2 See DAVID ROXAN & KEN WANSTALL, THE RAPE OF ART 10 (1964);
Nicholas, supra note 1, at 39; Urice, supra note 1, at *4; see also HECTOR
FELICimNO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE
WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 23 (1997) ("In twelve years... as many
works of art were displaced, transported, and stolen as during the entire Thirty
Years War or all the Napoleonic Wars.").
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fell squarely within his plan of a pure Germanic empire.3 Thus,
"[l]ooting was carried out with typical German efficiency,
planned beforehand and ruthlessly executed."4 Today, over fifty
years after the end of World War II, thousands of pieces of art
remain displaced because of Hitler's efforts.'
While 1998 saw the settlement of war claims against the two
largest Swiss banks, resolutions of ownership disputes about Nazi-
looted art have been few and scattered.' Yet as claims for restitu-
tion of these artworks have increased, international efforts at
resolution have also increased.7 Once predicted to be the "Swiss
gold" of 1999,8 this Comment contends that, despite recent efforts
towards a resolution of the controversy, hope for a real solution
to the problem of Nazi-looted art is overly optimistic in the ab-
sence of a binding international agreement. An international con-
sensus is necessary, but not sufficient, to ultimately resolve this
issue. While the issues surrounding the stolen art of the Holo-
caust ideally could be settled by individual nations through non-
binding principles of international cooperation that only impose
a moral commitment, 9 realistically, such an approach is unlikely
3 See Nicholas, supra note 1, at 3941.
4 ROXAN & WANSTALL, supra note 2, at 11. See infra Section 3 for a more
complete discussion of the Nazis' looting mechanism.
5 See CNN Saturday: 44 Countries Adopt Guidelines on Returning Art Stolen
by Nazis (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 5, 1998), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cnn File (estimating that although thousands of art objects were re-
turned by the Allies after tie War, more than 100,000 paintings and other
works are still missing).
6 See Jonathan Mandell, Art, NEWSDAY, Dec. 27, 1998, available in 1998
WL 2699567; Jodie Morse, Restitution, but at What Price?, TIME, Dec. 14, 1998,
at 78 ("In August, Switzerland's two largest banks agreed to pay $1.25 billion
to sette wartime claims against them."). Interestingly, while the Swiss bank
saga has received more attention, the value of the stolen art likely exceeds the
value of those assets. See Daniel Kurtzman, U.S. Congress Considers Action on
Plundered Artwork, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, Feb. 12, 1998, available in
1998 WL 11403230.
' See Morse, supra note 6, at 78 (discussing the issue of Holocaust repara-
tions). For a complete discussion of recent cooperative efforts, including the
Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets held in December 1998, see
infra Section 2.2.
8 Mandell, supra note 6 ("Art will become the Swiss gold of the new
year.").
9 In the Winter of 1998, the United States hosted the Washington Confer-
ence of Holocaust-Era Assets. The Washington Conference ended with the
adoption of 11 non-binding principles for resolving disputes over ownership of
Nazi-looted art. See infra Section 2.2.
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to be successful. In light of the historically duplicitous ap-
proaches many nations have taken in dealing with Nazi war loot"
and the implications of this issue for the art world, a finite resolu-
tion of this problem requires more than a moral obligation- it
requires a legally binding commitment that would render a de-
termination of ownership by a member country that is binding
on all parties. This legally binding obligation must explicitly pre-
empt individual statutes of limitations and set forth a uniform
policy agreed upon by all nations regarding the time in which to
raise claims.
Section 1 of this Comment gives a brief introduction to the
problem of Nazi-looted art. Section 2 addresses both formal in-
ternational agreements and treaties and the recent international
conference pertaining to Holocaust assets. Section 3 focuses on
the historical background of Hitler's attempt to rid his empire of
"degenerate art"" and to obtain an unparalleled collection of
Nordic-Germanic art. Section 4 outlines the U.S. approach to
disputes over Nazi-looted art. This Section discusses federal,
state, and private efforts at resolution. Section 5 examines the
sharply contrasting approaches taken by the Austrians, the
French, and the Swiss. Section 6 sets forth a proposal for resolv-
ing ownership rights to Nazi spoilage. Section 7 concludes the
Comment and reiterates that a finite resolution of disputes over
artwork looted by the Nazis requires an legally binding interna-
tional agreement.
2. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
This Section focuses on international efforts toward the resti-
tution of Nazi-looted art. During, and immediately following,
World War II, international commitment to returning these
works to their original owners appeared to be strong. 2 Quickly,
however, this fagade of dedication withered and for the ensuing
fifty years, nations were left to restitute owners on an individual
10 See infra Section 5 (highlighting the approaches taken by three foreign
nations).
" "Degenerate art" was the label given to artwork created by artists or in
styles disfav¢ored by Hitler. See infra Section 3.1.
12 See infra Section 2.1 (discussing international agreements); infra Section
4.1 (focusing on American and Allied efforts at repatriating this art).
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basis.13 As evidenced by the thousands of works that remain
separated from their original owners, 14 these individual efforts
largely failed." Recently, however, international efforts at resti-
tution have been renewed. 6 These efforts, however, will con-
tinue to fall short in the absence of a international legally binding
agreement.
The 1907 Hague Convention forbade the seizure and destruc-
tion of cultural property in a time of war and provided for com-
pensation for violations of these provisions." Thus, the Nazis'
pillage of Europe's art was both immoral and illegal. In 1943, the
Allies issued a directive, the Declaration of London, to deal with
the issue of Nazi loot prospectively. 8 The Declaration warned
neutral nations that the Allies intended "to do their utmost to de-
feat the methods of dispossession practised [sic] by the [Nazis]."19
In the Declaration, the Allies reserved the right to annul "trans-
fers or dealings hav[ing] taken the form of open looting or plun-
der" as well as seemingly good faith transactions, "even when
they purport to be voluntarily effected."2" Since the Declaration
dealt with private law matters, nations needed to enact it by indi-
vidual legislation.21 Initially, the Declaration was adopted so ex-
13 See infra Section 5.2-5.3 (describing the French and Swiss approaches to
restitution of the Nazi-looted art).
14 See CNN Saturday, supra note 5.
15 But see infra Section 5.1 (discussing the successful recent efforts of the
Austrian government).
16 Among the explanations posited for the renewed interest in Holocaust-
era claims is the ending of the Cold War. According to Hector Feliciano, dur-
ing the Cold War, the world was focused on battling Communists and rebuild-
ing Europe; when the Cold War ended, countries were "finally afforded...
the opportunity to analyze fundamental domestic, historical and societal ques-
tions, such as how to handle the continuing ripple effects of the Holocaust."
Daniel J. Bender, An Alternative Approach to Settling Disputes Over Stolen Art,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1998, at 1.
" See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention of
1907].
" See Declaration Regarding Forced Transfers of Property in Enemy-
Controlled Territory, 8 DEP'T ST. BULL. 21 (1943) [hereinafter Declaration of
London]; see also Lyndel V. Prott, Principles for the Resolution of Disputes Con-
cerning Cultural Heritage Displaced During the Second World War, in THE
SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 1, 225, 226 (discussing the Declaration of London).
19 Declaration of London, supra note 18.
20 Prott, supra note 18, at 226.
21 See id.
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tensively that "it became something of a common law in the
postwar period."' After the initial enthusiasm waned, however,
countries ceased a rigid application of the law.' Because nations
were not legally bound to enforce this law, they essentially did
not. Bound only by honor, individual nations failed to settle the
issue, leaving the rightful ownership of a great many pieces of art
unknown to this day.
2.1. International Agreements
In the years since World War II, three major international
conventions have attempted to deal with the problem of Nazi-
looted art. Because none of them garnered widespread accep-
tance, all have remained relatively ineffective. Further, because
all have focused on protecting nationally owned cultural prop-
erty, none has provided adequate recourse to private citizens, vic-
tims of Nazi art theft, seeking to reclaim individually-owned
property looted in the course of war.'
2.1.1. The Hague Convention
On January 6, 1999, President Clinton forwarded the 1954
Hague Convention to the Senate with a recommendation for rati-
fication." As the President explained, the Hague Convention "es-
tablishes a regime for special protection of a highly limited cate-
gory of cultural property... [and] provides both for preparations
in peacetime for safeguarding cultural property against foreseeable
effects of armed conflicts, and also for respecting such property in
time of war or military occupation."26
22Id.
' See id. (recounting the Swiss adoption and repeal of the legislation).
24 See Stephanie Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock" The Case to Suspend the Statute
of Limitations on Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
447, 475 (1999) (citations omitted).
" See President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (visited
Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.
eop.gov.us/1999/1/7/3.text.1> [hereinafter President's Message]; see also Major
New Treaty on Protecting Cultural Property in Times ofArmed Conflict Adopted
in the Hague, 26 Mar. 1999 (visited Jan. 16, 2000) <http://museum-security.
org/boylan.html> (indicating that the President recommended the adoption
of the Convention but not Protocol ]).
26 President's Message, supra note 25.
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However, that the United States is only now considering be-
coming a signatory to the Convention indicates that the Conven-
tion has not yet proven to be an effective solution to the problem
of Nazi-looted art. Further, the terms of the Convention itself
provide an inadequate solution to the problem.' The Conven-
tion limits the definition of "cultural property" to "movable or
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage
of every people.... . 2  This definition seemingly refers only to
nationally, as opposed to privately, owned property.29 Further,
the Convention gives signatories the ability to enforce sanctions
and penalties on violators "as they consider appropriate"" but
fails to provide any mechanism for settling disputes.1 These fac-
tors have led to inconsistent enforcement.32 Thus, "[w]hile the
Hague Convention is broad enough to promote respect for cul-
tural property during armed conflicts, the specifics do not ade-
quately address the question of restitution" of claims to Nazi-
looted art.3
2.1.2. The UNESCO Convention
While the United States is only now considering ratifying the
Hague Convention, in 1983, it ratified the 1970 UNESCO" Con-
vention on Cultural Property.3" The UNESCO Convention im-
2 See Cuba, supra note 24, at 476; Jennifer H. Lehman, Note, The Contin-
ued Struggle with Stolen Cultural Property: The Hague Convention, The UNESCO
Convention, and the UNIDROITDraft Convention, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 527, 535 (1997).
28 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 36 Stat. 2279, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S.
215, 242 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
29 See Cuba, supra note 24, 474 n.220 & 476.
30 Hague Convention, supra note 28, art. 3, 249 U.N.T.S. at 242.
31 See Lehman, supra note 27, at 535; Cuba, supra note 24, at 476.
32 See Lehman, supra note 27, at 535; Cuba, supra note 24, at 476.
33 Lehman, supra note 27, at 535.
31 UNESCO is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization.
31 See UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing
the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,
Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]; 19
U.S.C. S 2600 (1994). The United States was among the minority of major art-
market nations in ratifying the Convention. See Matthew Lippman, Art and
Idealogy in the Third Reich: The Protection of Cultural Property and the Humani.
tarian Law of War, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 76 (1998) ("The Convention's re-
strictions on the transnational flow of art has led to a refusal by most major
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poses on member-states an obligation to preserve and safeguard
cultural resources during both times of war and times of peace.36
Under its "nationalist" approach, each signatory must establish
agencies, enact legislation prohibiting domestic institutions from
acquiring illegally obtained cultural property, compile lists of
works of cultural influence, and set up cultural education pro-
grams."' However, "[tihe Convention only explicitly addresses
the broad obligations" of its members "to prevent cultural insti-
tutions from purchasing property which has been illegally ex-
ported and to return art stolen from a museum, religious institu-
tion or public monument."38 Beyond that, the Convention
provides "only a general responsibility to combat the illegal ex-
port or import of art and to entertain actions for the recovery of
artistic objects... ."3 Because the Convention does not address
the problem of displaced cultural property looted from or in the
possession of a private individual," it, like the Hague Conven-
tion, does not provide an adequate mechanism for adjudicating
claims to Nazi-looted art.
2.1.3. The UNIDR 0IT Convention
Unlike either the Hague Convention or the UNESCO Con-
vention, the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Ex-
ported Cultural Objects allows for claims by private individuals.41
However, because private claims must be brought "within a pe-
riod of fifty years from the time of the theft,"42 the UNIDROIT
art-market nations, with the exception of the United States, to ratify the Con-
vention.").
36 See Lippman, supra note 35.
37 See Cuba, supra note 24, at 477; see also Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Art
& Atrocity: Cultural Depravity Justifies Cultural Deprivation, 8 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 699 (1998); Lippman, supra note 35, at 74.
31 Lippman, supra note 35, at 78-79 (citations omitted).
'9 Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
40 See id.
" See UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 (1995), art. 2 (defining"cultural objects"
as "those which, on religious or secular grounds, are of importance for archae-
ology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science") [hereinafterUNIDROlT
Convention]; see also Cuba, supra note 24, at 478-79.
42 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 41, art. 3(4). Cultural property
"forming an integral part of an identified monument or archaeological site, or
belonging to a public collection" is not subject to the fifty-year limitations pe-
riod. Id. art. 3(5).
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Convention, like its predecessors, in its plain terms fails to pro-
vide a solution for settling claims to Nazi-looted art.4' Neverthe-
less, the Convention's balance of both civil and common law ob-
jectives "by providing fair and reasonable compensation in return
for requiring the possessor of stolen or illegally exported art to re-
turn the object" could serve as a model for any future proposal to
settle the issue."
2.2. Cooperative Efforts- The Washington Conference
In December 1998, the U.S. State Department hosted the
Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets. Attended by
over forty countries and numerous non-governmental organiza-
tions ("NGOs"), the Conference focused on the lost art of the
Holocaust and aimed at "forg[ing] an international consensus on
how governments and other entities can cooperate to redress
grave injustices" remaining from that era.4" The organizers
proved successful in these efforts as the Conference concluded
with the adoption of eleven principles to assist in settling the is-
sues surrounding Nazi-looted art.46 The guidelines call for a "just
and fair solution" and impose upon nations a "moral commit-
ment to identify and publicize stolen works" to aid in their re-
turn to their original owners.'
Leaders heralded the principles as redefining the manner in
which the art world will handle Nazi-looted art.48 "From now
41 Conceivably, however, nations could enact the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion and implement a longer limitations period in which to bring individual
claims. See id. art. 9(1) ("Nothing in this Convention shallprevent a Contract-
ing State from applying any rules more favourable [sic] to the restitution or the
return of stolen or illegally exported cultural objects than provided for by this
Convention."). However, no other "Contracting State" would be obliged to
recognize or enforce a "decision of a court or other competent authority of
another Contracting State that departs from the provisions of th[e] Conven-
tion." Id. art. 9(2).
" Lippman, supra note 35, at 82.
15 Stuart E. Eizenstat, On-the-Record Briefing on Holocaust-Era Conference
(visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http://www.state.govwww/policy remarks/1998/
981124_eizenstatholocaust.htnl > [hereinafter Eizenstat, Briefing].
46 See U.S. Dep't of State, Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-
Confiscated Art (visited Dec. 3, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/regions
/eur/981203 heacartprinc.html> [hereinafter Principles].
47 Holocaust Conference Concludes, UPI, Dec. 3, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, UPI File (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 See Stuart E. Eizenstat, Concluding Statement at the Washington Confer.
ence on Holocaust-Era Assets (visited Dec. 3, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/
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on," said Stuart E. Eizenstat, the U.S. Under Secretary of State
for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, "the sale, pur-
chase, exchange, and display of art from this period will be 'ad-
dressed with greater sensitivity and a higher international stan-
dard of responsibility."49 However, since the principles are not
legally binding but merely represent a moral commitment calling
upon countries to "act within the context of their own laws," 50
such sentiments may be overly optimistic.
2.2.1. The Principles in Practice?
Despite the enthusiastic reception the principles met at the
conference,"1 the ensuing years have shown that non-binding
principles alone are not an adequate solution. While progress has
been made, it has in no sense been uniform or steady.5
On a particularly encouraging note, the European Commis-
sion on Looted Art was launched in March 1999 in response to
the Washington Conference. 3 Among the Commission's key ob-
jectives are to create a timetable in which to implement the eleven
principles announced at the Washington Conference and to "put
restitution at the center of the agenda and to provide backing and
support for the pursuit of claims."' As the principles encourage,
www/policy remarks/1998/981203 eizenstat heac conc.html> [hereinafter
Eizenstat, Concluding Statement].
49 Id.
50 Principles, supra note 46; see also Judge Abner Mikva, Chairman's Con-
cluding Statement, Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets (visited Dec.
17, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/policy remarks/1998/981203 mikva
heac concl.htrnl> (expressing gratitude over -having reached "a consensus
that, -,thin the context of the national laws and national judicial processes of
the participating nations... offer[s] a means for addressing the major issues re-
lating to Nazi-confiscated art").
s See Eizenstat, Concluding Statement, supra note 48.
52 See Hugh Eakin, Unfinished Business, ARTNEWS, Sept. 1, 1999, available
in 1999 WL 9955745 [hereinafter Eakin, Unfinished Business]; Raphael Rubin-
stein, Nazi Loot." Seattle Concedes, Jerusalem Blushes, Vienna Stonewalls, ART IN
AM., Sept. 1, 1999,available in 1999 WL 9993244.
53 See U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Attempts to Trace Holocaust Assets
Typ o Asset Art (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.ushmm.org
assets/ushmm4.htm> (indicating that the Commission aims "to provide a
platform for all organizations, groups and individuals in Europe to speak with
one voice on this issue").
14 Id. (setting forth the eight major objectives of the Commission). Inter-
estingly, the Commission indicates that it will "work towards the establish-
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the Commission has committed itself to establishing alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve ownership claims and
has indicated its desire to establish an independent commission to
"assess, mediate and adjudicate on claims." ss The Commission's
ultimate goal, however, is to produce a comprehensive catalogue
of "looted art, its location and ownership, which will serve as a
permanent historical and cultural record of this epoch of depreda-
tion and spoliation.""'
Further, the past year saw the National Gallery of London's
"precedent-setting publication of 120 works, acquired for its col-
lection since 1933, which possess 'dubious provenance' 7 requiring
further study." 8 Interestingly, although the list is undoubtedly
the type of disclosure envisioned by the Washington Conference
Principles, British law does not allow for the return of these
works to their pre-war owners or their heirs.5 9 However, in Feb-
ruary, the British government announced that it was establishing
the Spoliation Advisory Panel to resolve disputes over Nazi-
looted art presently in the custody of British museums.6" Al-
though its recommendations will be without legal force, the
panel's powers will include recommending that looted works be
returned to their original owners, that museums pay "compensa-
tion to claimants or that museums display alongside a piece of
looted artwork an account of its history."61
While Great Britain and the European Community have
seemingly made headway in their attempts to put the principles
ment of uniform legal standards" to encourage Holocaust claims because
"[s]tatutes of limitation vary both within and outside Europe." Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
51 "Provenance" refers to "the history of ownership of an object." Beverly
Schreiber Jacoby, The Nazi Legacy in the Art World: Effect on Value Is One of
Many Issues, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30, 1998, at S2.
s Lee Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Developments, ART IN AMERICA, May 1,
1999, available in 1999 WL 9993141 [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Developments].
'9 See id. (indicating that "other compensation might be provided"). This
example aptly illustrates the inability of museums to "identify possible Nazi
loot in their collections, publicize their findings and return objects 'to their
rightful owners or their heirs, according to national legislation'" where their
national legislation prohibits them from so doing. Id. (noting a policy state-
ment made by the International Council of Museums).
0 See Brit Panel to Study Nazi-Looted Art (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://
dailynews.yahoo.com/htx/ap/20000217/wl/britain-nazi-art3.html>.
61 Id.
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into action, "[d]espite its promises at the Washington Conference
last December, Russia- which ended the war with more looted
art than any other country- has sent conflicting signals about its
readiness to resolve the problem."62 Instead of examining its own
collections for looted art, as the principles call on each country to
do, the Russian government has been busy cataloguing Russian
works stolen by the Nazis.63 Further, in October 1999, the Con-
stitutional Court of the Russian Federation upheld the constitu-
tionality of a statute allowing the country to nationalize "war
trophies" captured from former enemy states" after World War II
"as compensation for damages inflicted by the Nazis."6" Fortu-
nately, although the Russian high court upheld the statute, it
struck down key provisions and thereby exempted artworks
which were once owned by religious groups or by people perse-
cuted for their race or political views from the purview of the
law.66 The ruling further clarified that only objects removed by
order of the government were legally seized and thus properly
subject to nationalization under Russian criminal law.6 Fortu-
nately, the ruling did not establish ownership of any particular
piece of art and left open the possibility of employing legal pro-
cedures to settle claims.6" Further, as the head of the Constitu-
62 Eakin, Unfinished Business, supra note 52.
63 See id. (indicating that the Russian government has acknowledged that
many of these works have been destroyed).
" I.e., Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Finland. See
Sylvia Hochfield, Yeltsin s Objection Overruled, ARTNEWS, Oct. 1, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 W 9955832.
65 Id. (explaining that President Yeltsin opposed the legislation).
66 See id.; Eakin, Unfinished Business, supra note 52 (explaining the changes
made by the court). The court also ruled that
the following key changes must be made to the law: individuals can
make claims on their own as well as through governments; a list of
" ownerless" artworks currently hidden in Russian depositories must
be published so that the original owners or their heirs can claim them;
andthe claim period-originally scheduled to end on October 21, 1999,
18 months after the law came into force- must now begin when a
claimant first learns or could learn that his object is in Russia.
Hochfield, supra note 64.
67 See Hochfield, supra note 64.
6 See id.; Eakin, Unfinished Business, supra note 52 ("Because the Constitu-
tional Court ruling leaves open the possibility of using legal procedures to set-
tle claims, Hungarian officials have vowed to sue Russia in an international tri-
bunal for art loot it is unwilling to return.").
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tional Court was quick to point out, the court did not preclude
any future multinational agreements on the return of certain
valuables.
3. "THE RAPE OF ART"6 9
Inherent in Hitler's dreams of a pure Germanic race was a vi-
sion of pure Germanic art."0 His two-fold plan involved ridding
his empire of "degenerate art" and amassing a vast collection of
pure Germanic art, ironically financed by seizing and selling the
assets of Jewish art collectors.
3.1. 'Degenerate Art"
On one hand, he aimed to purge the world not only of works
of art he deemed unsuitable, but also of the artists responsible for
creating them." Hitler labeled such works "degenerate art" for
either their dreaded style or their hated creator and removed over
sixteen thousand of these works from public collections.' "Al-
though the Nazis found these 'degenerate' works unacceptable for
home consumption, they were not unaware of their market
value."73 Thus, as profits from their sale helped to finance the
second stage of Hitler's plan, these condemned works made their
way into collections worldwide. 4
69 This Section aims to provide a brief overview of the Nazi theft of Euro-
pean art treasures. The more intricate details and mechanisms of the looting
transcend the scope of this Comment. For a brief yet more in depth treatment
of the topic, see FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 1342. For a greatly detailed ac-
count of the Nazi theft of art, seeROXAN & WANSTALL, supra note 2. Nicho-
las, supra note 1, also provides a meticulous account.
70 See Nicholas, supra note 1, at 39; see also FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 24-
31 (discussing the Nazi quest to repatriate all works of "German heritage").
71 See Nicholas, supra note 1, at 39.
2 See id. (indicating that Hitler disliked anything that was abstract as well
as works created by Jewish, leftists, or antiwar artists);ROXAN & WANSTALL,
supra note 2, at 8 ("He disliked the French Impressionists so they would be to.
tally banned."); see also FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 20-21 (noting that in Mien
Kampf Hitler attacked Cubism, Futurism, andDadaism as products of degen-
erate minds" and argued that the state had a duty to prevent its people from
falling under these influences).
73 Nicholas, supra note 1, at 39.
'4 See id. at 39-40 (describing a special, secret marketing agency which al-
lowed the finest purged items to be bought for foreign currency at bargain
prices).
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3.2. The Linz Collection
Beyond ridding his empire of degenerate art, Hitler, himself a
failed artist, aimed to transform his hometown of Linz, Austria
into the artistic capital of his envisioned new Europe."5 Toward
this end, Hitler employed art specialists and charged them with
securing desirable works of art to build this great collection."6
These experts were to acquire works through mass acquisitions
and seizure of paintings from public and private collections in the
occupied countries such as France and the Netherlands.' In these
countries, they not only forcefully "bought" art, but they also
had works previously held by Jewish art collectors at their dis-
posal." Further, "Nazi officials threatened to confiscate collec-
tions or guaranteed visas or protection... in order to persuade
these Jewish collectors to sell their art to German entrepre-
neurs."79 By the tragically ironic logic of the Nazis, the confisca-
tion of Jewish collections was the natural extension of their pol-
icy of racial annihilation.8"
The Nazi quest for the artistic treasures of Europe was thus
rooted in the same pathology of domination and extermination
7s See ROXAN & WANSTALL, supra note 2, at 8. For a general discussion of
the plan for the museum in Linz, see Nicholas, supra note 1, at 41, and
FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 13-23.
76 See Nicholas, supra note 1, at 39-44; Urice, supra note 1, at *4; see also
ROXAN & WANSTALL, supra note 2, at 17-18 (listing the four categories of art-
work most in demand in World War II Germany).
77 See FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 21-23; see also Elaine L. Johnston, Cul-
tural Property and Worl War IL Implications for American Museums Practical
Considerations for the Museum Administrator, SC40 ALI-ABA 29, *31 (1998),
available in WESTLAW (indicating that the Nazis took millions of art objects
from their rightful owners "who included private citizens, especially Jews and
other victims of the Holocaust, public and private museums and galleries, relig-
ious, educational, and other institutions").
78 See FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 22; see also Margaret M. Mastroberar-
dino, Comment, The Last Prisoners of World War 11, 9 PACE INT'L L. REv. 315,
321 (1997) ("France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Russia
were all victims of Nazi devastation and confiscation.").
'9 Lippman, supra note 35, at 21. Wealthy Jewish art collectors were able
to secure visas in return for art. For example, in Austria, the "main cultural
target" of Nazi troops was the art collection of the Rothschilds, a prominent
Vienna Jewish Famiy. Id. at 15. One member of the family, Baron Louis de
Rothschild, was "interned by the Nazis for nine months and only was released
after agreeing to turn over his collection of more than one thousand highly-
prized paintings to the Nazi authorities." Id
8" Cf ROXAN & WANSTALL, supra note 2, at 22.
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underlying the Holocaust itself. In both the art world and the
human race, Hitler essentially aimed to "purify" all he deemed
"tainted" while usurping all that was desirable."1 But while the
lives of those killed by the Nazi regime are irrevocably lost, the
stolen art could be reclaimed with some effort. The restitution of
this art, the "highest achievement of [a] civilization," 2 might
bring about a long-delayed symbolic victory for the victims of the
Holocaust.
Sadly however, despite initial Allied attempts at restitution,
8 3
over fifty years later, much of the art still remains displaced. Be-
cause of lack of consensus, lack of legally binding obligation, and
a duplicitous manner of dealing with Nazi-related issues, individ-
ual nations have failed to realize the potential for restitution of-
fered by early cooperative efforts. Thus, they can only be suc-
cessful now if they are willing to do more than impose a moral
obligation on themselves- each nation must agree to be legally
bound.
4. THE U.S. APPROACH
Nations have attempted to restitute victims of Nazi spoilage
by implementing their own approaches. A close examination of
their individual efforts illustrates that although these methods
constitute a moral commitment, they lack a legally binding ele-
ment that would solidify and make restitution complete and sig-
nificant. In the next Section, an overview of the U.S. approach
81 cf FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 16 (indicating that although among
Western European countries Holland, Belgium, and France were heavily plun-
dered, in Eastern Europe "the Nazis undertook to destroy its identity, folk-
lore, architecture, and even its language through mass murder and forced Ger-
manization").
82 Stuart E. Eizenstat, In Support of Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, Pres.
entation at the Washington Con erence on Holocaust-Era Assets (visited Apr. 7,
2000) <http://www.state.govwww/policy remarks/1998/981203_eizenstat_
heacart.htrl>) [hereinafter Eizenstat, In Support].
83 See Johnston, supra note 77, at 32 (stating that after the War "vast num-
bers of objects were returned to their owners ... or repatriated to the coun-
tries from which they had been removed"); Nicholas, supra note 1, at 44; see
also Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks at Opening of Washington Conference on
Holocaust-Era Assets (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://secretary.state.gov/www/
statements/1998/981201.html> (indicating that the Allies made good faith,
but incomplete, efforts at restitution). For a discussion of U.S. policy immedi-
ately following the War, see infra Section 4.1.
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highlights some of the problems inherent in independent state ac-
tion without multinational collaboration.
4.1. U.S. Policy in the Post-War/Cold War Period
Like the Nazi forces, the Western Allies also had art-specialist
officers within their ranks." These "monuments officers" were
to secure and sort out the vast quantities of art that had been
looted by the Nazis in order to preserve and salvage these often
irreplaceable works."5 After the War, the Monuments, Fine Arts
and Archive ("MFA&A") forces had to "store, care for, cata-
logue, and restitute in orderly fashion the troves of art and ar-
chives that had been discovered in salt mines and hundreds of
other repositories."86 Towards this end, MFA&A officers inter-
rogated the "principle players" of the Nazi art-looting machine."
The army command established "Collecting Points" to process
the several million displaced pieces.8"
Despite the valiant performance of the MFA&A forces, not
all the U.S. efforts were beyond moral reproach. 9 Since the Al-
84 See Nicholas, supra note 1, at 43.
85 See id. See generally Bernard Taper, Investigating Art Looting for the
MFA&A, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 1, at 135-38 (recounting the expe-
rience of an art-intelligence officer).
86 Taper, supra note 85, at 135.
87 See id. at 136-37 (discussing interviews with Hitler's art advisers such as
Hans Posse and Herman Goring and art dealers such as Hans Wendland); see
also Nicholas, supra note 1, at 43 (indicating that the U.S. Office of Strategic
Services ("OSS") sent an "Art Looting Investigation Unit" to interrogate Nazi
officials in order to determine ownership of looted works). The purpose of the
OSS and MFA&A investigations was two-fold: (1) to aid the art restitution
process and (2) to provide evidence for the prosecution of these officials at
Nuremberg. See James S. Plaut, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 1, at 124-
25.
88 See Nicholas, supra note 1, at 43.
89 See, e.g., Walter I. Farmer, Custody and Controversy at the Wiesbaden Col-
lecting Point, in THE SPOIRS OF WAR, supra note 1, 130, 132-34 (recounting the
Wiesbaden Manifesto, borne of the frustration and outrage of officers with
President Truman's decision to have approximately 200 pieces of the most im-
portant German-owned works removed to Washington); FELICtANO, supra
note 2, at 175 (discussing pillage and attempts to sell looted work by American
soldiers); Willi Korte, Search Jor Treasures, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note
1, 150-51 (discussing the greed of an American Lieutenant who sent treasure
from the Middle Ages to his mother in Texas via military postal service). In-
terestingly, the newly formed Presidential Advisory Commission on Holo-
caust Assets in the United States, see infra Section 4.2.1.2, has acknowledged
complicity in the "Gold Train" incident. See Hugh Eakin, Tracking the Gold
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lies lacked any uniform policy on restitution, the United States,
like the other Allies, essentially controlled the retrieved art
within its occupied zone at its discretion." The United States
employed two standards for managing the art in its zone: one for
works stolen from various European nations, a second for the
state collections of Germany.91 For the former works, the
American military governor aimed to free his forces of responsi-
bility for this art. With this goal in mind, U.S. (as well as British)
policy was to return works to the country from which the Nazis
had taken it. 2 As to the German collections, the governor sup-
ported temporary removal of the "most precious" works to the
United States.93 President Truman thus had approximately 200 of
the most important German-owned works "temporarily" re-
moved to Washington.94
Regardless of official U.S. policy, new research indicates that
the U.S. military engaged in looting of its own.9" "For decades,
the case of the notorious Gold Train has remained one of the
murkiest episodes in post-World War II occupation of Europe by
American forces."96 The Gold Train was a hopeless effort by the
Nazis to collect everything of value from Hungary before the Red
Army arrived. 7 The train was captured by U.S. troops in Austria
in May 1945, but American officials rejected pleas from Hungary
Train, ARTNEWS, Dec. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9955986 [hereinafter
Eakin, The Gold Train].
o See Nicholas, supra note 1, at 44.
91 See ii
92 See id. at 44 (indicating that this left the recipient nation with the"nasty
task" of determining ownership).
9' Id at 44. Some U.S. officials argued that these works should be"indefi-
nitely" removed to America and be considered "reparations." Id.
94 This decision proved unpopular with MFA&A officers who questioned
the propriety and integrity of such action. See Farmer,supra note 89, at 132-34.
Although the "safeguarding" may not have originally been truly envisioned as
"temporary," the removal ultimately proved to be so partly as a result of out-
cry from museum professionals and the press. See Nicholas,supra note 1, at 44.
9 See Eakin, The Gold Train, supra note 89 (stating that this is the "first
time the American government has implicated itself to such a degree in the is-
sue of unrestituted loot" and that "the report does not attempt to explain why
American forces ignored regulations calling for the return of looted assets"),
Did the U.S. Army Rob Holocaust Victims? (visited Mar. 7, 2000)
<http://usmilitary.about.com.military/jobs/usmilitary/library/weekly/aalO
1699.htm >.
91 Eakin, The Gold Train, supra note 89.
17 See id.
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to return the assets from the train to Hungarian Jews after the
war.9" Instead, the American authorities handed over much of the
loot to Austria while at the same time American troops took a
large amount of property as "war booty."99
4.2. Congressional Action
Initial post-war attempts at restitution fell short, and by the
middle of the 1950s, "[t]he formal efforts to recover and return
displaced cultural property diminished substantially or ceased al-
together."100 Recently, however, interest in the fate of the Nazi-
looted art has resurfaced, and the United States has renewed its
efforts to redress the problem." 1
4.2.1. The 105tb Congress
In February 1998, the House Banking and Financial Services
Committee held hearings to question representatives of the art
community about how they determine the provenance of works
in their collection and how they deal with claims by those alleg-
ing that a work was stolen from them or their families during the
Holocaust. 2 Although no legislation directly emerged from
these hearings, "several members of Congress have stated an in-
tention to introduce bills that will specifically address the obliga-
tions of museums to avoid acquiring or exhibiting Holocaust-
tainted objects and to return such objects to their rightful own-
ers." 103
98 See id. ("For the Hungarians, the report comes as longoverdue [sic] ac-
knowledgment of what they have known f6r years.").
99 Id1
100 Johnston, supra note 77, at 32.
101 See id.
10 See id. at 33. The hearings took place on February 12, 1998. See id.
The directors of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Museum of Modern Art
("MOMA"), and other top American museums testified. For the transcripts of
the witnesses' statements, see Johnston, supra note 77, app. The transcript is
also available online at (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/bank/hba46854.000hba46854_0f.htm>.
103 Johnston, supra note 77, at 33 (citations omitted). Although the federal
government has passed no such legislation, the guidelines of the American As-
sociation of Museum Directors (5AAMD") set forth similar requirements.
These guidelines are discussed infra Section 4.4.1.
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4.2.1.1. Holocaust Victims Redress Act
Amid a plethora of proposed legislation, the 105th Congress
passed three laws relating to the Holocaust." On February 23,
1998, the "Holocaust Victims Redress Act" became law.' This
Act authorizes the President to commit $5 million for archival re-
search and translation services to aid in the restitution of Holo-
caust-era assets.106 The Act further states that all governments
should make good faith efforts to aid in the return of Nazi-
confiscated assets to legitimate owners where there is reasonable
proof that the claimant is the rightful owner. 7 While Congress's
willingness, albeit belated, to address the problem of Nazi-looted
art is commendable, it will amount to no more than empty words
if other countries do not accept the challenge. Given the surrepti-
tiousness that has shrouded this issue for almost fifty years, it
seems unlikely that legislation embodying the "Sense of CongressRegarding Restitution of Private Property,"1°8 without more, willopen the floodgates.0 9
4.2.1.2. U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission
With broad bipartisan support, Congress passed legislation es-
tablishing the U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission on June 23,
1998.110 The U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act provides for
the establishment of an independent presidential commission to
" For an overview of enacted and proposed Holocaust-related legislation,
visit the section of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum's website
devoted to the topic at 105th Congress and Holocaust-Related Legislation (visited
Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.ushmm.org/assets/legislation.htm> [hereinafter
105th Congress and Holocaust-Related Legislation].
105 See id.
106 See Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 103(b), 112
Stat. 15 (1998).
107 See id. § 202.
108 Id.
109 The legislation, however, likely contributed to the ever-growing inter-
national dialogue on the topic of Holocaust assets. To that extent, it may
prove helpful in reaching a definitive resolution of the issue.
"o See United States Information Service ("USIS"), 01-04-98 Text: Eizenstat
on Bill to Create US Holocaust Assets Commission (visited Dec. 18, 1998) <http.
www.usembassy.org.uk/ forpol8o.html > (discussing the Under Secretary of
State's "delight" with the bipartisan support of the then bill).
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examine the role of the United States in the collection and dispo-
sition of Holocaust-era assets."'
4.2.1.3. Nazi War Crime Disclosure Act
The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, passed in October
1998, calls for a "Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Work-
ing Group" to make public Nazi war criminal records."' By de-
classifying heretofore classified information, the legislation aims
to acknowledge the horrors of the Holocaust and to achieve jus-
tice for survivors and their heirs.' Although these are laudable
efforts, unilateral action by the United States is not enough. A
legally binding solution that makes other nations accountable is
necessary.
4.2.2. The 106th Congress
The 106th Congress has shown a similar initiative in terms of
its commitment to Holocaust-related legislation. However, like
its predecessor, this Congress has been less effective in passing
Holocaust-related laws than introducing them."' Amid many
proposals, to this point, it has enacted only one Holocaust-related
law.
1" See U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
186, 112 Stat. 611; see also USIS, supra note 110 (explaining that the substantive
work of the Commission will fall into two areas: (1) conducting original re-
search into Holocaust-era assets that came into the hands of the U.S. govern-
ment after Hitler's ascent to power in 1933; and (2) reviewing research being
conducted elsewhere).
112 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 1859
(1998); see also 105th Congress and Holocaust-Related Legislation, supra note 104.
113 But cf Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: Testimony Before theSubcomm.
on Gov't Management, Info., and Tech. of the House Govt Reform and Oversight
Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of William Z. Slany, Historian, Dep't
of State) (recognizing the wel1-intentioned nature of disclosure while counsel-
ing caution in opening all records).
114 See Office of Congressional Relations, The 106th Congress and Holo-
caust-Related Legislation (last modified Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.ushmm.
org/assets/legi2.htm> [hereinafter 106tb Congress and Holocaust-Related Legis-
lation].
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4.2.2.1. The U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Extension
Act of 1999
On December 12, 1999, President Clinton signed the U.S.
Holocaust Assets Commission Extension Act of 1999 into law. 15
The original Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998 called for
the commission to submit its final report by December 31,
1999.116 This Act extended the deadline until December 31,
2000.117 Further, it increased and prolonged the funding for the
Commission.'
4.2.2.2. Proposed Legislation
To date, the 106th Congress has considered eight Holocaust-
related bills."9
4.2.2.2.1. Making a "Federal Case" of It
Two House bills120 and one Senate bill121 propose a federal
cause of action for certain Holocaust-related claims. These pro-
posals would give federal district courts jurisdiction over civil ac-
tions to "recover damages or secure relief for certain injuries to
persons and property under or resulting from the Nazi govern-
ment of Germany.""z District courts would have original juris-
diction" to hear and grant relief for any Holocaust-related civil
115 See id.
116 See 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (1998). Section 3(d)(1) requires the Commission to
"submit a final report to the President" containin "any recommendations for
such legislative, administrative, or other action as it deems necessary or appro-
priate." Id. "After receipt of the final report, the President," under section
3(d)(2), was then required to "submit to the Congress any recommendations
for legislative, administrative, or other action that the President considers nec-
essary or appropriate." Id.
117 See H.R. 2401, 106th Cong. (1999).
.1. See id. (amending Section 9 of the U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission
Act of 1998 "by striking '$3,500,000' and inserting '$6,000,000'" and "by strik-
ing '1999, and 2000,' and inserting '1999, 2000, and 2001'").
'19 See 106th Congress and Holocaust-Related Legislation, supra note 114 (dis-
cussing introduced legislation).
120 H.R. 3254, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 3402, 106thCong. (1999).
121 S. 1856, 106th Cong. (1999).
122 Id.; see also 106th Congress and Holocaust-Related Legislation, supra note
114.
1' Jurisdiction would be asserted pursuant to "customary international
law, any international agreement to which the United States is a party, or, to
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claim, brought by January 1, 2010, to recover damages or secure
relief for injuries resulting from having been "deprived of prop-
erty located in Germany, or in any territory occupied or con-
trolled by the Nazi regime or its allies.., pursuant to programs
designed to transfer ownership of such property to persons of
Aryan racial stock."124
Tellingly, the plain language of this proposed statute reveals
an imperfect understanding of the rationale behind the Nazi-
looting machine. The Nazis did not simply seize art to transfer
ownership to non-Jews."2 As discussed above, they looted "de-
generate" works that clashed with Hitler's ideal of a pure Ger-
manic art.'26 Seizures of "degenerate" works were not necessarily
"designed to transfer ownership.., to persons of Aryan racial
stock" as would be required to bring a case under the Act. 2"
Rather, the Nazis seized these works to rid their empire of them,
and had it not been for their market value, they likely would have
destroyed these works.' Thus, the 'act could potentially deny
certain claimants of Nazi-looted art a cause of action.
4.2.2.2.2. Justice for Holocaust Survivors Act
The House has also proposed legislation to allow Holocaust
survivors, who are currently U.S. citizens and who have ex-
hausted remedies available under German law, to sue the German
Government in federal court.'29 This proposal would amend the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA") 30 which currently
the fullest extent permitted by Article iI, section 2 of the United States Con-
stitution, the laws of any nation." S. 1856, 106th Cong. (1999).
124 Id. The proposal would also give a cause of action tothose forced into
involuntary labor, subject to involuntary medical treatment or experiments, or
denied payment with certain insurance policies. See id.
125 See Lippman, supra note 35, at 26 ("Various categories of art were re-
moved and confiscated.").
126 See id As discussed infra Section 3.1, even different classes of"degener-
ate art" existed. "Hitler disapproved of the abstract art of Vasily Kaninsky
and Franz Marc. Cammille Pissaro, as a Jew, was considered to be a racial pa-
riah. George Grosz and Kathe Kollwitz were condemned as leftists." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
127 S. 1856, 106th Cong. (1999).
128 See Nicholas, supra note 1, at 39 (discussing the Nazis' awareness of the
market value of "degenerate art").
129 See H.R. 271, 106th Cong. (1999).
"I See 28 U.S.C. S 1605 (1994).
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prohibits the federal courts from entertaining suits brought
against the German government.131 However, the bill, in its cur-
rent form, would only give the federal courts jurisdiction over
claims for "money damages sought against the Federal Republic
of Germany for the personal injury... caused by an act of geno-
cide committed against that citizen during World War II."132
Thus, although this act would abrogate the sovereign immunity
of the German government, it would not provide a mechanism
for settling disputes over Nazi-looted art.
4.2.2.23. Proposals to Amend the Tax Code
Three of the eight Holocaust-related bills before Congress in-
volve proposed amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. One
house bill would have prohibited imposing any federal income
tax on any income received by an individual as the result of adju-
dicating or settling "any injustice experienced by the individual as
a Holocaust victim.""' Another bill, which was ultimately ve-
toed by President Clinton as part of the Taxpayer Refund Act of
1999, would have excluded from gross income "any amount re-
ceived by an individual (or any heir of the individual) from any
person as a result of any moral or legal injustice experienced by
such individual as a Holocaust victim."134 Although no tax-break
has yet been secured for those prevailing on Holocaust-related
claims, the potential of one could provide an incentive for the
creative settlement of cases involving Nazi-looted art.
131 See 106th Congress and Holocaust-Related Legislation, supra note 114.
132 H.R. 271, 106th Cong. (1999).
133 See 106th Congress and Holocaust-Related Legislation, supra note 114; see
also H.R. 390, 106th Cong. (1999).
134 106th Congress and Holocaust-Related Legislation, supra note 114 (discuss-
ing the Holocaust Survivor Tax Act of 1999 (H.R. 1292, 106th Cong (1999)
and S. 779, 106th Cong. (1999)). The language of the Act was incorporated
into the Taxpayer Reftind Act, H.R. 2488, 106thCong. (1999), which was ve-
toed by President Clinton on September 23, 1999. See 106th Congress and
Holocaust-Related Legislation, supra note 114. A third tax code-related bill,
H.R. 3511, 106th Cong. (1999), would prohibit deductions under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 "for any payment under a foreign-based Holocaust vic-
tims' settlement if no deduction would be allowed under such Code for such
payment were it made directly by the foreign bank or other entity entering
into such a settlement." Id.
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4.3. State Action: New York 3'
The federal government has not been alone in its efforts to
settle the issue of Nazi-looted art. State involvement in the cause
has also increased. 136 The state-level, however, is not the proper
level at which to solve this issue. Unilateral actions by the states,
as demonstrated by the MOMA Case discussed below, may have
detrimental consequences for the art world, 3 ' while the restraints
of statutes of limitations may create a time-bar to many legitimate
claims.138
4.3.1. The MOMA Case
In December 1997, the Museum of Modern Art ("MOMA")
received letters from two families alleging that two Egon Schiele
works139 on loan to the museum from Austria belonged to their
families." After the Museum informed the claimants that it was
in no position to decide their claims, the Manhattan District At-
torney subpoenaed the MOMA, thereby freezing the works in
New York until ownership was determined. 4'
135 Since New York has a particularly vital position within the art world,
the author has chosen to use the state as a paradigm to illustrate the repercus-
sion of unilateral state action. New York also serves as a useful starting point
for a discussion on the effects of statutes of limitation.
136 In 1997, New York established a Holocaust Claims Processing Office to
assist claimants seeking to recover lost Holocaust assets (i.e., money in Swiss
banks, unpaid insurance, and art). The Office's website invites claimants to
submit their claims, but tellingly cautions that "[this Office, however, does
not have the power to personalry search for any assets in Europe or to mandate
certain actions" from certain European institutions. New York State Banking
Department, Holocaust Claims Processing Office (visited Apr. 7, 2000) < http:/
www.claims.state.ny.us/>.
137 See infra Section 4.3.1.
138 See infra Section 4.3.2.
139 The two works were Dead City and Portrait of Wally. See Judge Rules
Contested Art Works Must Return to Austria: Up dates with Decision to Appeal,
AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2280444 [here-
inafter Judge Rules].
140 See In the Matter of the Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art ("MOMA"), No. 98469,
slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 13, 1995) [hereinafter MOMA].
141 See id. at 872; Robert Hughes, Hod Those Paintings: The Manhattan
D.A. Seizes Alleged Nazi Loot, TIME, Jan. 19, 1998. Interestingly, before the
D.A. intervened the Austrian owners of the work proposed that an interna-
tional tribunal make a binding determination of the arts ownership. With such
cooperative owners, the subpoenas appeared unnecessary to determine who
held legitimate title. See id. (suggesting political motives).
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These events sent chills through the art world. As the
MOMA argued, "the success of New York's museums in present-
ing first class exhibitions on a consistent basis is dependent, in
part, on their ability to provide assurances to art lenders that their
work will be safely returned."" U.S. museums feared that if a
state could intervene in claims of ownership by subpoenaing all
allegedly stolen works, no foreign museum would be willing to
loan artwork for exhibition in the United States."4 The art
community was further concerned that if the Manhattan District
Attorney prevailed, museums would face the burdensome task of
researching the provenance of every work on loan for a tempo-
rary exhibit.1"
Although the district attorney argued that a ruling for the
MOMA would render New York a haven for stolen art, the trial
court ruled that New York law protected the paintings from sei-
zure. 4 The judge rejected the district attorney's overly cautious
argument. However, the appellate court overruled the decision
and found that the anti-seizure statute did not apply to a sub-
poena issued as part of a criminal investigation. " 6 Ultimately, the
Court of Appeals of New York reversed the intermediate court
and held that the statute protects artwork of nonresident lenders
from any kind of seizure.
If states dealt with the issue by unilateral actions like those
advocated by the Manhattan District Attorney, museums would
find themselves in a precarious position: torn between a moral
142 MOMA, supra note 140, at 875.
143 See Francine Cunningham, Art with a Dubious Past, IRISH TIMEs, Aug.
12, 1998, at 11 ("United States museums now dread the possibility that other
collectors will refuse to lend European paintings in case they are seized during
international shows."); cf MOMA, supra note 140, at 875 ("To satisfy this con-
cern, for the past thirty years New York cultural institutions have relied on a
state law which exempts from seizure any art lent to a cultural institution by a
nonresident exhibitor."). The Court was referring to section 12.03 of the New
York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law ("ACAL"). A similar federal statute, 22
U.S.C. § 2459 (2000), provides similar protection to works on loan from
abroad which are culturally significant and if the eihibition is "in the national
interest" as determined by the U.S. Information Agency.
144 See MOMA, supra note 140, at 884 (concluding that this would be an
undue burden).
145 See id. See generally Judge Rules, supra note 139.
146 People v. Museum of Modern Art, 688 N.Y.S.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999).
147 In re Museum of Modern Art, 93 N.Y.2d 729, 735 (N.Y. 1999).
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obligation to victims of the Holocaust, their legal obligation to
lenders, and their self-imposed obligation to the public. 4 ' The
gravest danger, however, is neither the threat of New York be-
coming a safe repository for art with cloudy title, nor the poten-
tially detrimental effect on New York's position as an artistic cen-
ter,"" but the threat to the public. As the New York Court of
Appeals noted, the intent of the anti-seizure statute was twofold:
"to insulate nonresident lenders from seizures via legal process
and, concomitantly, to protect state cultural institutions that de-
pend upon the free flow of art for the benefit of the people."'50
To allow state authorities to seize allegedly stolen works of art
would likely deprive the American people of any opportunity to
view foreign-owned works on exhibition in this country without
furthering the goal of returning the works to their rightful own-
ers.
151
4.3.2. The Legislative Response
Interestingly, the New York State Legislature promptly re-
sponded to the Court of Appeals decision with proposed "legisla-
tion to allow State intercession when artwork on loan in New
York is suspected of being stolen property."" 2 The proposals
would amend the anti-seizure statute to prohibit "attachment,
execution, sequestration, replevin, distress or any kind of civil
seizure" while a work of art owned by a nonresident is on exhibi-
149 See, e.g., Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the
Museum: A Proposed Solution to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U.1. INT'L L. &POL. 15, 16 (1999) ("A museum's essential activity is to hold works of art as a
public trust for the education and benefit of the general public."); Michelle I.Turner, Note, The Innocent Buyer of Art Looted During World War II, 32VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1511, 1543 (1999) ("For museums which consider
themselves public trusts, the public's interest in being able to see the artworkmay be a primary goal in any litigation."); Hughes,supra note 141 (discussing
the MOMA's contract with the Austrian owner).
149 MOMA, supra note 140, at 884 ("New York should not be faulted forproviding an atmosphere conducive to the temporary exhibition of foreign
ar't.").
150 In re Museum of Modern Art, 93 N.Y.2d at 736.
151 I.e., foreign owners of works with cloudy title could avoid any dispute
by keeping the items in their homeland. Cf Cunningham, supra note 143, at
11 (discussing the withdrawal of two paintings from a Bonnard retrospective
when it moved from London to the MOMA in the wake of the Schiele dis-
pute). e Roy L. Reardon & Mary Elizabeth Mcgarry, Artwork Allegedly Stolen
by the Nazis, N.Y.Lj., Oct. 14, 1999.
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tion in the state."5 3 The quick reaction of the legislature suggests
that the balance struck by the courts may only be temporary and
that the courts will likely not have the last word on this debate.
4.3.3. The Statute ofLimitations
"Despite [the] rule that even a good faith purchaser cannot
acquire title to [stolen] property in a common law country,15 4 the
original owner will be unable to recover the object in a court in
the United States, if the statute of limitation bars the claim." 55
To allow a purchaser to feel secure in his ownership, the passage
of time bars the original owner's claim and the law treats the cur-
rent possessor as the owner.156 Thus, often the greatest barrier to
Holocaust plaintiffs' claim of ownership is the statute of limita-
tions.'57
4.3.3.1. Disunity among the States
In New York, a plaintiff has three years in which to bring a
claim to recover stolen property held by a good faith purchaser.158
Under New York's "demand and refusal" rule, the statutory pe-
riod is tolled when the original owner demands that the possessor
153 S. Bill 6211, 223d Leg. (N.Y. 2000); Ass. Bill 9075, 222d Leg. (N.Y.
1999).
154 In civil law countries, a thief may transfer good title to a good faith
purchaser. Under the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"), a transferor can convey only the title he holds, i.e., a thief may not
transfer title to stolen property. See Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural Property and
World War IL" Some Implications for American Museums a Legal Background, SC
40 ALI-ABA 17, 19 (1998) available in WESTLAW. See infra Section 6 for a
discussion of the good faith purchaser standard.
.55 Id. at 20. The rationale behind statutes of limitations is that as time
passes, it becomes increasingly harder for parties to present accurate evidence
and testimony regarding past events. For a full discussion of the rationale of
these statutes, see d.
156 This is true despite the common law rule regarding transfer of title to
bona fide purchasers. See id.
157 See Lawrence M. Kaye, Laws in Force at the Dawn of World War II: In.
ternational Conventions and National Laws, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note
1, at 100, 104 (discussing the obstacles posed by the statute of limitations).
Since most states have a statute of limitations for recovery of personal property
between two and six years from the accrual of the cause of action, the crucial
question in cases involving stolen art is when does the cause of action accrue.
For an excellent overview of this issue and how different states handle it, see
generally Gerstenblith, supra note 154, at *20-24.
15' See Kaye, supra note 157, at 104.
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return the property at issue and the possessor refuses."5 9 By con-
trast, in New Jersey a cause of action does not accrue until the
original owner has notice of the whereabouts of the stolen prop-
erty or should have obtained such notice through due diligence.""
In New York, due diligence is irrelevant to the tolling of the stat-
ute of limitations, but comes into play with the defense of
laches. 61 "Laches is an equitable defense used to mitigate the
harsh effects of a statute of limitations when defendants have been
prejudiced by plaintiffs who 'slumbered on their rights.'"162 A de-
fendant can prevail on a laches defense where he can establish that
the plaintiff's unreasonable delay caused him undue prejudice.'63
Thus, although New York does not require original owners exer-
cise due diligence to toll the statute of limitations, it does require
that they comply with a "standard of reasonable diligence. " "'
However, because the defendant must also demonstrate prejudice,
despite this requirement of reasonableness, New York's rule is
nevertheless quite favorable to plaintiffs.'65
"' See id. at 104; Gerstenblith, supra note 154, at *20-21. In New York, a
claim concerning a work stolen by the Nazis in the early 1940s would not nec-
essarily be time barred in the 2000s. Consider the following hypothetical con-
cerning a claim for a work stolen by the Nazis in 1942: in 1999, 47 years later,
the statute of limitations would not have run out and would not even begin
tolling until the present possessor refused the original owner's demand for the
painting.
160 See Gerstenblith, supra note 154 at '121 ("This rule puts the burden on
the true owner to establish that he or she has used due diligence in searching
for the property."). "Due diligence means 'persistent and continuous inquires
through multiple channels of investigation.' It involves an inquiry into title,
warranties, authenticity, and provenance." Kelly Diane Walton, Leave No
Stone Unturned: The Search for Art Stolen by the Nazis and the Legal Rules Gov-
erning Restitution of Stoleni Artwork, 9 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. LJ. 549, 580 (1999) (citations omitted).
161 See Walton, supra note 160, at 590.
162 Id. at 581 (citations omitted).
163 See id. at 580.
164 Id. at 592.
165 In fact, New York is probably the most pro-plaintiff jurisdiction. See
Kaye, supra note 157, at 105 ("Few jurisdictions are as favorable to plaintiffs as
New York."); see also Walton, supra note 160, at 592 (citation omitted) (indicat-
ing that commentators have argued "that stolen art, at least in courts following
the New York laches rule, really has no statute of limitations"). However, -
though the defense of laches "may appear illusory because of the difficult
burden it places on the good faith purchaser, Walton points out that as Nazi-
looted art receives more public attention and as databases become more com-
prehensive, "the laches defense may become more beneficial to the purchaser."
7d_ at 598.
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While New York's approach to the statute of limitations
quandary would allow most Holocaust owners to proceed with
their claims, claimants in other jurisdictions, such as New Jersey,
would likely find their claims time-barred. In most forums,
plaintiffs would have to prove they had exercised due diligence in
attempting to locate their possessions.1" Placing this burden and
imposing a time restriction on victims of Nazi theft is illogical
and appears unjustifiable.' While encouraging the trade of
goods'6 is a worthy goal, returning works of art to victims of
Nazi looting is undoubtedly a loftier and more compelling one.
The justifications underlying statutes of limitations pale in com-
parison to the moral concern calling for the return of Nazi loot.
In cases involving Nazi-looted art, placing the burden of time and
due diligence on the original owner seems only to further victim-
ize Holocaust victims. Yet, even if all jurisdictions within the
United States agreed to adopt New York's approach or to sus-
pend statutes of limitations altogether to deal with this problem,
that would not be enough. The problems posed by the disparity
in time-requirements and the application of statutes of limitations
to the claims of Holocaust victims is not limited to the United
States. Thus, an international consensus is required.
4.3.3.2. Differences Between Nations
While dismissing an otherwise valid claim based solely on the
expiration of the statute of limitations period terminates the
claim, it hardly resolves or settles a valid claim involving Holo-
caust spoilage. For the time being, the use of legal technicalities
such as the statutes of limitations is inappropriate in the context
of the morally reprehensible actions of the Nazis. 6' Nations
'" See Gerstenblith, supra note 154, at *23-26 (examining the "due dili-
gence" standard).
167 See Kaye, supra note 157, at 105 ("[Olne may well ask why a nation or
an individual from whom that property is wrongfully taken during wartime
should lose the right to have the property returned because of the mere passage
of time.").
168 See Gerstenblith, supra note 154, at *20.
169 As argued by Kaye, it seems only logical that no statute of limitation
should apply where the claimant seeks the return of cultural property seized
during war. See Kaye, supra note 157, at 105; see also Phillippe DeMontebello,
Art Plundered During the Holocaust, Speech at the National Press Club
Luncheon (July 14, 1998) (transcript available in LEXIS, News Library, Federal
News Service File) ("[F9rankly, I would not see using the technicality of an ab-
stractly found date as a reason to deny a completely legitimate claim from the
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must agree to suspend requirements such as statutes of limitations
in order to reach any definitive solution. That New York has a
particularly "forgiving" statute of limitations is not enough. The
differences in statutes of limitations within and across national
boundaries prevent a finite resolution of ownership claims to
Nazi-looted art absent an international agreement.
The problems posed by varying statutes of limitations support
the argument for an international areement to suspend statutes
of limitations into the near future.' 0 The resolution of claims
over the stolen art of the Holocaust should not depend on the
statute of limitations in a particular jurisdiction. Should no in-
ternational consensus be met, the next best alternative might be
to grant federal jurisdiction over cases brought within a certain
time period."' 1
4.4. Private Action: The Art Community
"The leading international museums rely on borrowing paint-
ings from overseas to present first-rate shows."" For years, U.S.
museums have depended on federal and state laws to protect these
loans from detention or seizure."7 3 Recently, however, as in-
creased attention has turned to the issue of Nazi-looted art, con-
cern has mounted over whether museums have been using these
process."). The use of the standard limitation period seems particularly inap-
propriate given that "[t]he Nazis' policy of looting art was a critical element
and incentive in their campaign of genocide against individuals of Jewish and
other religious and cultural heritage." Cuba, supra note 24, at 469.
170 Cf Stephan J. Schlegelmilch, Note, Ghost of the Holocaust Holocaust
Victim Fine Arts Litigation and a Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule, 50
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 87, 113 (advocating the imposition of a"discovery rule"
and indicating that "[a] strict statute of limitations ignores the mobility and
ease of concealment of stolen art, while no statute of limitations allows a
would-be plaintiff to sit on her rights, thereby causing prejudice to a defen-
dant").
171 Cf Tarquin Preziosi, Note, Applying a Strict Discovery Rule to Art Sto-
len in the Past, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 225, 226 n.3 (1997) (discussing New York
Congresswoman Nita Lowey's plan "to introduce legislation allowing Ameri-
can citizens to sue in federal court to recover artwork abroad that was stolen
during the Holocaust"). The proposed legislation, discussed infra Section
4.2.2.2.1, would give federal district courts jurisdiction in civil cases arising
from personal and property injuries inflicted by the Nazi government brought
by January 1, 2010.
"7 Cunningham, supra note 143.
173 See id.; see also supra note 143. See, e.g., MOMA, supra note 140, at 875
(discussing MOMA's argument for the application of ACAL).
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laws to evade the issue of ownership of Holocaust-era assets."
While the ethical issues surrounding Nazi spoilage "threaten the
free flow of art across the Atlantic," critics have pleaded with mu-
seums not to "turn a blind eye.""' They have not.
4.4.1. AAMD Principles
The American Association of Museum Directors ("AAMD")
has issued principles "deploring 'the unlawful confiscation of art
that constituted one of the many horrors of the Holocaust and
World War II,"' setting guidelines "for resolving claims," and of-
fering database recommendations."7 6 These guidelines aim to bal-
ance the competing concerns of resolving claims of stolen art and
keeping works available for public enjoyment and education. 7
The guidelines call upon museums to conduct provenance re-
search to determine if any works were illegally confiscated during
the Nazi era."78 If a museum discovers an unlawfully confiscated
work, it must publicize the finding." 9 The AAMD further rec-
174 See, e.g., MOMA, supra note 140, at 875 (discussing the district attorney's
argument); Cunningham, supra note 143, at 11; Garance Franke-Ruta, Lobbying
& Law: The Artful Dodgers, NAT'L J., Apr. 4, 1998; cf Roger Franklin, The Big
Steal (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.theage.com.au/daiy/980606/news-/
news23.html > (describing an incident in which the National Gallery returned
alleged Nazi spoilage to Switzerland and denied that it "bore any moral or legal
responsibility for determining ownership of the paintings" and insinuating that
the AAMD task force was created in response to the MOMA incident). But see
DeMontebello, supra note 169 (attempting to dispel misconceptions about the
complicity of the museums).
'75 Cunningham, supra note 143.
6 AAMD, AAMD Task Force Report Proposes Principles and Guidelines on
Art Looted During Nazi/World War II Era (1933-1945) (last modified on June 4,
1998) <http://www.aamd.net/r060498.shtml> [hereinafter AAMD, Task
Force Report Press Release].
177 See DeMontebello, supra note 169 ("Surely it will be in everyone's best
interest whenever possible to marry simple justice and public service.");see also
AAMD, Task Force Report Press Release, supra note 176 (characterizing the
guidelines as "reconciling the interests of individuals who were dispossessed of
works of art ... with the fiduciary and legal obligations and responsibilities" of
museums to the public they serve).
178 See DeMontebello, supra note 169. Interestingly, neither the law nor
industry custom has requires art buyers to conduct title searches. See Franklin,
supra note 174. For the complete report of principles, guidelines and recom-
mendations, see AAMD, Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoilation ofArt
during the Nazi/World War 11 Era (1933-1945) (last modified June 4, 1998)
<http://www.aamd.net/guideln.shtrl> [hereinafter AAMD, Task Force Re-
port].
179 AAMD, Task Force Report, supra note 178, ll.D.
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ommended that member museums consider using mediation to
resolve claims regarding art allegedly confiscated during the Sec-
ond World War."' The AAMD also expressed its commitment to
employing the databases established by third-party groups regard-
ing claims, claimants, works confiscated, and works later resti-
tuted.'
s
For the efforts of U.S. museums to prove fruitful, they must
not be alone in their attempts at regulation. While one would
hope that the AAMD guidelines could serve as a model for inter-
national regulation of claims regarding Nazi-era looted art, the
guidelines are not binding on any government or on any foreign
museum."2 Yet, any resolution of claims of Holocaust-era loot-
ing of art would necessarily have its greatest impact upon the in-
ternational art community, the industry that buys, sells, and dis-
plays these works. The involvement of museums, on an
international level, is thus crucial to any real attempt at settle-
ment. Education and access are vital and deserved goals, involv-
ing museums in any agreement can further these ends. Museums
could effectively represent the moral and social interests that must
be integrated into any legal solution.
4.4.2. The Guidelines in Action?
Museums have shown varying degrees of commitment to the
principles set forth by the AAMD. In June 1999, the Seattle Art
Museum voted to return a $2 million Matisse" 3 to the family of a
180 See id. ]I.E. During his address to the National Press Club, a reporter
asked DeMontebello, the Director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and th&
head of the AAMD, why museums should give up paintings bought in good
faith. His answer indicated that museums should not necessarily have to give
up works bought in good faith. This, according to DeMontebello, was the
reason to turn to mediation. See DeMontebello,supra note 169.
181 See AAMD, Task Force Report, supra note 176, I; see also De-
Montebello, supra note 169 (expressing optimism about the role of databases
planned by the World Jewish Congress's Commission for Art Recovery and
the National Jewish Museums' Holocaust Art Restitution Program( HARP")).
182 Fortunately, French and Dutch museums have parallel organizations
and are drafting similar guidelines. See DeMontebello, supra note 169; Eizen-
stat, Briefin supra note 45; Eizenstat, In Support, supra note 82. But cf infra
Section 5.2 (discussing the actions of French museums). The British Museum
and Galleries Commission ("MGC") has issued a statement of principles on
Nazi-looted art.
183 The painting, entitled Odalisque, was painted in 1927. See Rubenstein,
supra note 52.
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prominent Jewish art dealer from whom the Nazis stole the
painting."' After research into the painting's provenance con-
ducted by HARP confirmed the claims of the Rosenburg heirs,
the museum followed through on an earlier pledge to turn over
the painting.18 The decision, along with a similar decision by the
Berlin National Gallery,18 has been heralded as setting a "major
precedent for museums and private collectors around the world"
to forego "costly and protracted legal battles.""u'
While the Seattle Art Museum's actions fulfill the mandate of
the AAMD guidelines to equitably resolve claims to Nazi-looted
art,188 not all member museums have demonstrated an equally
strong commitment to the guidelines. According to the guide-
lines, "[m]ember museums should not borrow works of art
known to have been illegally confiscated during the Nazi/World
War II era and not restituted"18 and should "endeavor to review
provenance information regarding incoming loans."' Neverthe-
less, even though a claim had been filed with the Art Loss Regis-
ter ("ALR") two months before the exhibit began, the Boston
Museum of Fine Arts'("MFA") blockbuster Monet exhibition in-
cluded Monet's "1904 Water Lilies borrowed from a group of
some 2,000 works recovered by the Allies in Germany after
World War II and held in trust by the National Museums of
France for eventual return to claimants."191 While it is tempting
18 See id.; John Marks, Doing the Right Thing (visited Jan. 16, 2000)
<wysiwyg://5/http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/990628/nazi.htm>.
... See Rubinstein, supra note 52.
186 See Marks, supra note 184 (indicating that "the Berlin National Gallery
agreed to restore a $5 million Van Gogh drawing to Gerta Silberberg, whose
father-in-law perished in a concentration camp in Poland").
187 Id.
188 See AAMD, Task Force Report, supra note 176, ll.E.2 (calling on mem-
ber museums to work with claimants to determine the provenance of claimed
pieces and to resolve legitimate claims "in an equitable, appropriate, and mutu-
ally agreeable manner").
189 Id. I.F.2.
190 Id. II.F.1.
19' Lee Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims: Art with a History, WALL ST. J.
(Europe), Jan. 29, 1999 at 14 [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Claims]. See infra Sec-
tion 5.2 for a discussion of the 2000 works "temporarily" held by French gov-
ernment. After this violation of AAMvD guidelines came to light, the museum
placed an explanatory placard beside the painting indicating that the work was
claimed by heirs of a French Jewish art dealer and collector, Paul Rosenberg,
whose inventory the Nazis looted in 1940. See Walter V. Robinson,MFA Ex-
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to criticize the MFA for the gulf between its practices and the
AAMD principles, such a reaction ignores a possible flaw in the
principles: that their ban on loans of Nazi-looted art shields these
works from public display where they can be seen by potential
claimants. Interestingly, rather than condemning the MFA's de-
parture from the guidelines, Elaine Rosenberg "noted that her
opportunity to eyeball the Monet in Boston allowed positive
identification of the work as the same one that her family
sought," allowing them to file a formal claim with France."'
Regardless of the wisdom of all of the AAMD's provisions
and the MFA's shirking of them, the MFA, however, has made
some strides towards executing the guidelines. The AAMD calls
upon its members to "review the provenance of works in their
collections to attempt to ascertain whether any were unlawfully
confiscated during the Nazi/World War II era and never resti-
tuted."'93 Last February, the museum uncovered documents from
1948 regarding claims to a landscape by Henri met de Bles and of-
fered to return the work to the Dutch government if they could
provide evidence that it had been stolen.'94 Tellingly, however,
five decades of inaction, numerous reports by the Boston Globe,
and pledges made by the AAMD proceeded the museum's at-
tempt to return the painting which it had acquired in 1946.195
Still the MFA deserves credit for not standing behind legal tech-
nicalities to hold onto the de Bles and for attempting to take re-
sponsibility for its actions in the 1940s. 96 Back then, the MFA
"simply did what everyone else was doing- acquiring fine art
hibition Acknowledges Background, Theft ofMonet Work, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
5, 1998, at Bi.
192 Rosenbaum, Claims, supra note 191 (quoting Mrs. Rosenberg, Paul Ro-
senberg's daughter-in-law, as saying "If you don't show these pictures, it
doesn't help the owners to find them.").
'9' AAMD, Task Force Report, supra note 176, [I.A.
194 See Walter V. Robinson, Question of Ownership Taints MFA Painting,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 1999, at Al. Apparently, the Dutch first informed
the MFA that the painting had been stolen from Holland by the Nazis and
asked for its return in 1948. See id, The MFA responded by insisting the
Dutch provide the museum with "'definite' evidence it had been stolen." Id.
195 See id.
1'96 See id. (indicating that according to Boston University law professor
Alan Feld, the MFA "might have sound legal standing to retain the artwork
for statute of limitations reasons, since the Dutch kiew in 1948 where the
painting was").
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without asking too many questions."19 At the very least, the
AAMD principles are finally encouraging American museums to
confront those questions.
5. FOREIGN APPROACHES
Left to their own devices, nations have taken varying ap-
proaches to the issue of Nazi spoilage. While there are no clear-
cut "right" answers to this problem, an examination of the vary-
ing approaches of three nations aptly highlights the need for true
international consensus before the problem can be "solved."
5.1. Austria: Righting Past Wrongs
Perhaps in part to acknowledge their complicity during the
Nazi-era, Austrians have confronted the issue of Nazi confiscated
art head-on and have provided a useful model in so doing."9 In
1995, the Austrian government enacted legislation giving the Aus-
trian Jewish Community ownership over the "heirless treas-
ures"1 99 looted by Nazis that the government had held in storage
for five decades." The following autumn, major auction houses
held an auction to sell off these works to benefit Holocaust survi-
vors and their heirs.2 1 More recently, in 1998, Austria enacted
legislation to provide for "restitution notwithstanding such legal
obstacles as the statute of limitations." 2 2 In accordance with the
197 Id.
198 See CNN Newsroom: A Sale of Art Confiscated from Jews During World
War II Closes a Chapter in the History of the Holocaust, (CNN television broad-
cast, Nov. 26, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Cnn File ("Much too
long, we have denied responsibility for what Austrians did to millions of
Jews."); Eizenstat, Concluding Statement, supra note 48; see also Hughes, supra
note 141 (calling the Austrian conduct in the restitution of art"impeccable").
199 CNNNewsroom, supra note 198 ("[T]he Austrian government, the peo-
ple in general, either forgot about them or didn't know what to do with them.
hey're basically heirless pieces of art.").
200 See id.
201 See id. (indicating that as a matter of morality if any original owners
came forward, the art would be returned); see also USHMM, Governmental and
Private Attempts to Trace Holocaust Assets by Type, by Country (visited Apr. 7,
2000) <http://www.ushmm.org/assets/legislation.htm> (chronicling the ef-
forts of various nations to deal with Holocaust-era assets) [hereinafter Chroni-
cle].
202 Eizenstat, Concluding Statement, supra note 48; see also Eizenstat, In
Support, supra note 82 (applauding Austria's decision to return looted art in the
possession of its federal museums and collections despite the availability of le-
gal defenses); Chronicle, supra note 201 (indicating that the proposed Austrian
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law, Austria returned 200 pieces of art to the Rothschild family
that were subsequently auctioned at Christie's for $90 million."3
Given Austria's then model behavior, the decision of a New
York district attorney to seize the two allegedly looted works
"seemed particularly insulting."0 4 When the district attorney
seized the two paintings, Austria was attempting to come to
terms with its past and to offer a fair resolution to problem of
Nazi-looted art. Unilateral action such as that of the New York
District Attorney, thus, not only shakes the trust underlying the
international art trade,0" but also calls into question a nation's in-
tegrity. An international agreement setting a unified standard of
conduct could provide a guide for judging appropriate behavior;
absent such an agreement, however, one nation cannot be the
judge of another's efforts. The resulting insult could result in un-
conscious retaliation (i.e., refusal to cooperate). By placing Aus-
tria on the defensive, New York risked compromising the coun-
try's impressive efforts to repatriate this art.
5.1.2. A Step Backwards?
Once hailed as an exemplar for other nations, over the past
year, the mixed-bag that is Austrian restitution efforts now
epitomizes the problems inherent in nations being left to deal
with the issue of Nazi-looted art on their own. For "[e]ven if the
need for restitution had been emphasized by the law in parlia-
ment, legal technicalities were being dug up to prevent these resti-
,,216tutions. After the Rothschild restitution, the Austrian restitu-
tion commission rejected the claims by the foreign heirs of an
Austrian Jewish family for the return of paintings by Gustave
legislation is accessible via the internet, in German, at <http://www.
parlinkom.gv.at/pd/pm/XX/I/his/013/I01390.html>). Apparently, the law
was proposed after "research into state archives showed that authorities ha[d]
extorted-certain works from [families] in exchange for export permits to re-
move the larger part of their collection." Id.
203 See Eakin, Unfinished Business, supra note 52.
204 Hughes, supra note 141; see also discussion supra Section 2.3.
205 See supra Section 2.3.
206 Hubert Czernin, Counsels of Very Gru4ing Justice (visited Feb. 4, 2000)
<http://www.allemandi.com/TAN/news/article.asp?idart=810> ("The Aus-
trian Parliament decided that full restitution of works of art should be made to
victims of the Nazis and to those who had been coerced into giving works after
1945 to museums. But the advisory council has twice taken its own, negative,
line.").
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Klimt.217 "[F]orced into exile and robbed of his collection by the
Nazis, Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer died in Switzerland in 1945" and
bequeathed the Klimt paintings, "although they were no longer in
his possession, to his family, which had also fled Austria.""' The
restitution committee indicated that the Klimt paintings fall out-
side the purview of the 1998 law because of Adele Bloch-Bauer's
1923 will, which instructed her husband to leave the paintings to
the Austrian National Gallery should she predecease him.2 9 The
committee's argument, however, failed to acknowledge that the
will was written before the second World War and the persecu-
tion of Austrian Jews.21" Because the committees denied their
claim, the claimants are now pursuing their case in the Austrian
courts, and the committee is viewed with great skepticism and has
had its favorable decisions go all but unnoticed.
Despite the restitution committee's mixed performances, the
Austrian museum community has taken compliance with the
1998 Restitution Law and the Washington Conference principles
seriously. In January, the Joanneum Museum announced that it
held about seventy works of art it believes were looted by Na-
zis. 12 The museum indicated that the owners of about half of the
pieces had been identified and that photos of the others would
"be posted on the Internet if no owners can be found." 211 Unlike
American museums, which have been criticized for waiting for
Nazi-looted art to be claimed rather than announcing that they
have questionable holdings,214 Austrian museums at least appear
committed to identifying and returning the looted art in their col-
207 See Eakin, Unfinished Business, supra note 52 (discussing the Bloch-Bauer
case and indicating that the trove of art work claimed by the family is worth
approximately $100 million); Rubinstein, supra note 52.
208 Rubinstein, supra note 52.
209 See id.
210 See id. The committee's "decision provoked widespread outrage in the
art world and was criticized by an array of Austria's political and cultural
elite." Eakin, Unfinished Business, supra note 52 (indicating that a week after
the decision an open letter was sent by 100 Austrian intellectuals urging the
return of the works); see also Rubinstein, supra note 52.
211 See Czernin, supra note 206.
212 See George Jahn, Austrian Museum May Have Looted Art (visited Jan. 16,
2000) <http://ailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20000112 /wl/austria looted art_
1.html>. -
213 Id.
214 See U.S. Museums Slow to Disclose Holocaust Art- WIJC (visited Feb. 20,
2000) <http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/000218/bol. html >.
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lections as the principles announced at the Washington Confer-
ence urge.21
5.2. France: Sluggishness and Manipulation of Law as a Barrier
to Restitution
During World War II, the Nazis looted approximately one-
third of the known private art collections in France.216 After the
War, Germany returned more than 61,000 works to the French
government, who returned over 45,000 works to their respective
owners.21 Of the remaining 15,000 works, the government sent
approximately 2000 of the "most important" works for "tempo-
rary" safeguarding in museums and auctioned the remaining
works with little public fanfare.218 By decree, the museums were
to be "precarious holders" of the works, responsible for preserv-
ing them, exhibiting them, assisting dispossessed collectors and es-
tablishing a "provisional inventory."" 9 Although these works be-
long to neither the French government nor the museums housing
them, most of these works have been in the ",rovisional cus-
tody" of French museums for the past fifty years.
5.2.1. Publicity is the Mother ofAll Action
While the French have taken steps towards settling the con-
troversy surrounding these works of art, they have done so only
when forced by the embarrassing glare of the spotlight. Since the
publication of Hector Feliciano's groundbreaking book on
France's covert management of Nazi spoilage, The Lost Museum,
French museums have been "moving sluggishly and replying cau-
tiously to an ever widening circle of people interested in the sub-
ject.""' A 1996 investigation by the French Cour des Comptes,
the audit office, criticized the French state and museum curators
for their failure to make any actual attempt to locate the owners
215 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, art. 5.
216 See Andrew Taber, France's Dirty Little Artistic Secret, SALON:
NEWSREAL (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.salon.com/may97/new
/news970515.html> (discussing FELICIANO, supra note 2).
27 See FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 216.
218 Id. at 218.
219 id. at 218-19.
220 Id. at 214.
221 Id. at 234.
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of these works of art.'m The following year, the French Prime
Minister established a committee to determine the status of the
valuable property confiscated from French Jews during the
War.' During 1997, the French government displayed 987 of
these looted works in three exhibitions to assist owners and their
descendants in reclaiming them."
5.2.2. Outsiders'Perceptions: Criticism and Skepticism
France's efforts to return Nazi spoilage have met with suspi-
cion and criticism." Tellingly, "as the French government repre-
sentatives in Washington said that they would go along with" the
non-binding principles, the Georges Pompidou Centre in Paris
told the heirs of a major French collector that they could not re-
claim a stolen Georges Braque 6 because "the statute of limita-
tions has expired."'m Given France's shirking of moral responsi-
22 The report further criticized the museums for failing to identify the
provenance of-the works and for minimizing the importance of these works in
their holdings. See id. at 237; John Lichfield Paris, Robbery that Followed the
Holocaust 2,000 Art Works in French Museums, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan.
28, 1997, (International Section), at 11.
2 Paris, supra note 222, at 11.
"2 See Chronicle, supra note 201; Taber, supra note 216; see also
FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 238 (indicating that these exhibitions were not
enough). Five paintings were returned because of these exhibitions. See Tom
Heneghan, Chirac Wants France to Keep Art Nazis Looted (visited Dec. 18, 1998)
< http://museum-security.org/reports/07798.html >.
' See Taber, supra note 216; FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 238; Richard
Wolffe & John Authers, France Accused over Looied Art Works: Jewish Groups
Claim Paris is Dragging its Feet Over Cor ensation for Masterpieces that were Sto-
len from Victims of the Nazis, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 3, 1998, (World News-
Europe), at 2. During the Washington Conference, the World Jewish Con-
gress pleaded with the French government to release the works or to follow
the lead of Austria and auction the unclaimed art. See id. Under French law,
however, the government is merely the temporary custodians of the art and
thus cannot auction the works. See id. Interestingly, French Jewish leaders
have requested that the works remain in France and that the French govern-
ment should take legal ownership of these works by paying compensation to
the French Jewish community. See Heneghan, supra note 224.
226 The Guitar Player. See Susannah Herbert, International Museum Sued by
Jews over Braque Theft; DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 3, 1998, at 27.
'CNN Saturday, supra note 5; see also Herbert, supra note 226 (explaining
that the heirs were told that under the French civil code"anyone buying a sto-
len work in good faith can keep it unless its owners lodge a claim within three
years"). The museum claimed to be good faith owners because it had bought
the work from a Swiss art dealer who "had obtained it legally on the art mar-
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bility for fifty years, " 8 this behavior, while disappointing, is
hardly surprising. Until it is bound to do otherwise, the French
museum community can continue to evade justice by resorting to
technicalities and by distinguishing between looted works held by
French museums as temporary custodians and looted works
bought on the market by French museums. Works belonging to
the former class, like Leger's Woman in Red and Green, are slowly
being returned to their original owners, 9 while good-faith pur-
chaser laws shield the latter class." ° Thus, the promise to repatri-
ate these works amounts to empty words as long as a nation can
avoid its moral obligation through a rigid application of its own
laws. t An internationally binding agreement is thus required.
5.3. Switzerland: The Convenience of Neutrality
"[I]n the unique circumstances of World War I, neutrality
collided with morality; too often being neutral provided a pretext
for avoiding moral considerations."232 Switzerland's neutral status
immunized it from the Allied monitoring that occupied and bel-
ligerent nations received.233
ket." Judy Siegal, French Museum Says It Is Owner of Nazi-Seized Art,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 3, 1998, at 6.
22 See, e.g., FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 214. This is not to suggest that the
French restitution efforts have had only negative results. Recent French resti-
tution efforts have been mixed. See Eakin, Unfinished Business, supra note 52
$"The Louvre has agreed to return five 17th-century Italian paintings to a fain-
y that has claimed them for almost five decades.").
" See Seattle Loses Its Matisse and Courtcase (visited Jan. 16, 2000)
< http://www.artnewsroom.com/flash/matisse.htm >.
230 See Rosenbaum, Developments, supra note 58 (indicating that the Pom-
pidou defends its position on Braque's Guitar Player because "the Braque is not
among the works held by the French museums for eventual return to rightful
owners").
SI.e., the rigid application by the French of France's good faith pur-
chaser laws. This resort to technicalities is not unique to the French. Cf
FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 155 (discussing how Swiss laws "facilitated art traf-
ficking and provided an ideal refige for both sellers and buyers").
232 WILLIAM Z. SLANY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS
TO RECOVER AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN
BY GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II PRELIMINARY STUDY v (1997). See gen-
erally FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 155-62 (discussing how Switzerland's neutral-
ity worked to its advantage, enabling it to amass a large amount of Nazi-looted
art work during and after the war).
733 See FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 191. Although beyond the scope of this
comment, Feliciano provides an interesting and informative discussion of the
Swiss art market during World War II. He indicates that the Swiss were not
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To placate the Allies, in 1945, the Swiss adopted legislation
that voided transactions involving Nazi loot that otherwise would
have received the protection of its bona fide purchaser laws. 4
Two years later, as the watchful eye of the Allies turned else-
where, the Swiss suspended this legislation." Henceforth, stan-
dard Swiss civil law governed these transactions. Under Swiss
law, a bona fide purchaser gains title to stolen goods after five
years of possession, and if a stolen painting is sold through a
dealer or at an auction, the legitimate owner must reimburse the
buyer before reclaiming his possession. 6 Thus, in Switzerland, a
claimant to Nazi-looted art would either have her claim dismissed
because the statute of limitations had expired or would incur
compensation costs." Again, technicalities thwarted the claims
of victims of the Nazi regime.
Unlike the Austrians, the Swiss seem content to ignore their
cooperation with Nazi forces. During the war, a smuggling ring
brought looted art from France to Switzerland." For the past
fifty years, much of it has remained under the protection of Swiss
law and a veil of secrecy. 9 Further, given choice of law rules un-
der which the substantive law of the forum where the wrong oc-
curred applies,24 the determination of ownership of a work
playing with clean hands and have used their law to protect themselves and
these paintings. See id. at 155-62.
" See Prott, supra note 18, at 226 (discussing the Swiss adoption of the
Declaration of London). For a discussion of the Declaration, see infra Section
2 and accompanying notes.
235 See Prott, supra note 18, at 226.
236 See FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 155; see also Prott, supra note 18, at 226
(explaining that the Swiss repealed the law to avoid liability that it would have
incurred under its interpretation of the legislation, i.e., the government would
have had to compensate the good-faith purchaser). See generally Gerstenblith,
supra note 154, at *19-26 (explaining bona fide purchaser laws).
" See FELIClANO, supra note 2, at 192 (indicating the Allies' disgust with
the fact that the claimant would have to go to court in the first place).
231 See id. at 188.
239 See id. at 191.
240 See Gerstenblith, supra note 154, at '126 ("The traditional choice-of-law
doctrine in the United States is the lex loci delicti commissi rule which states
that the substantive law of the place where the wrong was committed governs
the case."). In New York, for example, the"borrowing statute" provides that
actions occurring outside the state may be subject to the statute of limitations
of the foreign jurisdiction, even if the limitations period is shorter than that of
New York. See Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A Call for a New Atti.
tude Toward Artwork Stolen During World War II, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 1, 15 (1998) (discussing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202 (McKinney 1990)).
[Vol. 21:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss2/4
OWNERSHIP OF NA ZI-LOOTED ART
bought in Switzerland might be subject to Swiss laws, thus defeat-
ing a claim brought by an original owner in the United States or
elsewhere.24' Although an original owner would have no claim
against a Swiss "owner" if the work remained in Switzerland, the
original owner might nonetheless have a claim if the work came
into the possession of an American "owner." Such a claim then
would put the original owner against the new American "owner."
The Swiss approach dramatically illustrates how one coun-
try's inflexibly technical rules have international repercussions
that preclude a definitive determination of the ownership of
Holocaust art absent a international legally binding solution.
6. PROPOSAL
To reach a solution on this issue, countries must be willing to
look outside of their existing legal framework. The "ordinary
rules designed for commercial transactions of societies" should
not apply "to people whose property and very lives were taken
by one of the most profoundly illegal regimes the world has ever
known."242 While the principles announced at the Washington
Conference call upon countries to achieve a "just and fair" solu-
tion, they ask them to do so within the structure of their existing
laws. To reach such a solution, however, many countries must
alter their laws in a way that is collaborative of other countries.243
Historically, many nations have shown an utter disregard for the
same moral commitment that these eleven principles impose
upon them.2' Hence, to exact a solution to this problem requires
that countries agree to be legally obligated to reform their na-
tional laws to allow claims to Nazi-confiscated art to proceed.
Recognizing the sui generis nature of the Holocaust, countries
should come to a moral recognition that legal technicalities
should not bar claims to the lost art of the Holocaust. Allowing
claims to proceed, however, does not necessitate that the works
be returned to the original owner or that the claims proceed in a
241 However, the policy of returning Holocaust loot could preclude such a
possibility. Cf. Gerstenblith, supra note 154, at *26-*27 (noting this possibility
might be avoided if the policy -ehind the common law rule that a thief may
not transfer title outweighs the conflict of law analysis).
242 Eizenstat, In Support, supra note 82, at 3.
243 Countries could, for example, suspend statutes of limitations and allow
mitigation to good faith purchaser laws.
244 See, e.g., infra Section 5.
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traditional judicial forum. 4 Further, as discussed above, while
claims should be heard into the near future, this does not mean
that claims must be heard indefinitely. At some point, ownership
should become secure; after a certain amount of time, possessors
should be able to obtain clear title to a work.246 A central registry
for claims to Nazi-looted art could "include some listing proce-
dure where the absence of a claim for a set number of years after
publication would be recognized as clearing title."
247
The issues involved implicate many complex concerns that in
turn require creative solutions. For example, not all members of
the Jewish community support claims brought over these
works.24 Moreover, both international Jewish groups and na-
tional groups lay claim to the many heirless works lingering in a
purgatory of sorts. Also, while the bona fide purchaser presents a
far less sympathetic claim than the looting victim, subsequent
purchasers who undertook the transaction in true good faith
should not necessarily loose all legal rights. 49
245 Mediation or alternative dispute resolution, for example, may provide
more appropriate venues for raising these claims. See generally Bender, supra
note 16 (discussing establishing an art dispute resolution commission and
pointing out the weaknesses of traditional litigation).
246 See Bender, supra note 16. Legislation proposed in New York would
enable a purchaser of stolen artwork or cultural property to obtain
clear title so long as the purchaser, prior to purchase, checked with a
(only one) computerized registry... to determine whether a theft vic-
tim had registered a claim to the object within three years prior to the
proposed purchase. If the theft victim had not registered a claim
within the three-year period, the claimant's right of recovery would
be time barred three years after purchase.
Marilyn Phelan, Cultural Property, 33 INT'L LAW. 443, 445 (1999).
247 See Bender, supra note 16.
248 See DeMontebello, supra note 169. DeMontebello supplies an anecdote
about a Jewish man of modest means expressing anger over the focus "on the
belongings of the 50 richest families in Europe during the war." Id. According
to this man, "six million of us didn't have paintings to exchange for the lives
of" their families, and "they shouldn't have them back. They were able to buy
the freedom of their family." Id.
249 See generally JoHN 0. HONNOLD ET AL., SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY 27-30 (1992) (explaining that economic realities and effi-
ciencies require attention to the bona fide purchaser). Bona fide purchaser laws
attempt to strike a balance between the competing interests in secured owner-
ship and safe commercial transactions. See id. at 27.
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The first American case to settle resulted in an agreement to
"split the baby."2" The dispute over a looted Degas"' ended with
the Art of Institute of Chicago acquiring the work jointly from
both the heirs of the original owners and the current owner. 2
Such settlements provide the only real solution to these issues by
avoiding the circus of claims and counterclaims. 3 Private resolu-
tion also allows for the consideration of interests that might hold
little persuasive power in a court of law. Here, not only did the
heirs receive compensation while the original owners and the pre-
sent owner received attribution for their contribution, but their
settlement also served the public's interest in access to art. A
court, in contrast, would only have had the power to make a de-
termination regarding ownership.
7. CONCLUSION
Fifty years after the end of the Second World War, much of
the art that was looted by the Nazis remains in museums and pri-
vate collections across the United States and Europe.
Beyond the moral issues, claims to ownership of these looted
works threaten the normal functioning of the art world. Since
the art market does not function purely on a national level, only
when nations jointly agree to hear legitimate claims to Holocaust
spoilage and such claims have been settled can ownership in these
works of art be secure.
250 Judith H. Dobrzynski, Settlement Is Reached over a Looted Degas, INT'L
HERALD TRIB. (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), Aug. 15, 1998, at 8 (internal quota-
tions omitted).
251 Degas's pastel, Landscape with Smokestacks, was the work in dispute.
See Mandell, supra note 6, at (FanFare), 3.
25 The Institute paid the original owners half the value of the work, and
the plaque which will hang with the painting will name both the original own-
ers and the present owner as the benefactors. See id.
251 However, according to newspaper reports as late as May 1, 1999, the
landscape that was
lauded as a model by the U.S. State Department's Under Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs [sic] ... was languishing in storage at
the Art Institute of Chicago, pending resolution of renewed squabbles
among the museum, the heirs of Holocaust victims Friedrich and
Louise Gutmann, and the work's most recent in a chain of subsequent
owners.
Rosenbaum, Claims, supra note 191, at 14. See also Rosenbaum, Developments,
supra note 58.
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Left to independent action, countries have too long ignored
their moral obligation to assist victims of Nazi looting and their
heirs. While the recent adoption of non-binding principles marks
a step in the right direction, it simply is not enough. Countries
must not only be morally responsible for exacting a solution to
this problem; they must be legally liable. A finite settlement of
this issue requires a legally binding international agreement to set-
tle claims over Nazi-looted art. Failure to reach such an agree-
ment would essentially allow the defeated and deranged efforts of
the Nazis to retain custody of these "last prisoners of World War
][. "
2 4
Mastroberardino, supra note 78, at 315 (quotingJack Kelly, The Spoils of
War/Show Ignites Debate over Ownership, USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 1995, at ID
("They are the last prisoners of World War II, about to emerge from the dark
rooms where they were locked away 50 years ago.")).
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